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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
WOO V. DELUXE CORPORATION: THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT ADOPTS THE “SLIDING SCALE”
STANDARD OF REVIEW WHEN A CONFLICTED
PLAN ADMINISTRATOR DENIES ERISA-
PROTECTED BENEFITS
I. INTRODUCTION
To determine whether an employee is entitled to receive employee
benefits, the employee benefit plan administrator must decide whether the
employee is covered by the employer’s benefit plan. When administrators
deny a claim for benefits, the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”)1 gives plan beneficiaries the right to seek judicial review.2
ERISA, however, does not establish the standard of review in such cases.
The United States Supreme Court announced the appropriate standard of
review in the seminal case of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch.3 Bruch
held that a plan administrator’s denial of benefits “is to be reviewed under a
de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the
terms of the plan,”4 in which case the denial is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Bruch added, however, that “if a benefit plan gives discretion to
an administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest,
that conflict must be weighed as a ‘facto[r] in determining whether there has
been an abuse of discretion.’”5
Since Bruch, federal appellate courts have disagreed on the appropriate
standard of review in cases where a conflicted plan administrator denies
benefits. The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth circuits have adopted the
“sliding scale” approach. This approach reviews the denial of benefits for an
abuse of discretion, with the level of deference given to the administrator’s
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) and in scattered
sections of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9722 (1994)).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
3. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
4. Id. at 115.
5. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187, cmt. b (1959)).
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decision decreased in proportion to the seriousness of the conflict.6 The
Third, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits apply the “presumptively void” test.7
Under this approach, there is no deference and the conflicted administrator’s
denial of benefits is presumed to be arbitrary and capricious unless the
administrator can show “that either (1) under de novo review the result
reached was correct, or (2) the decision was not made to serve the
administrator’s conflicting interest.”8
Initially, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals seemed to adopt the
“presumptively void” test.9 However, in a recent decision, Woo v. Deluxe
Corp.10 the Eighth Circuit adopted the “sliding scale” approach. This Recent
Development analyzes the Eighth Circuit’s apparent change of law and
discusses whether the Eighth Circuit’s position is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bruch and the underlying purposes of ERISA.
II. HISTORY
Before ERISA, employee benefits and pension law consisted primarily of
state common law.11 Although employers routinely offered benefits and
pensions to attract and retain employees, expectations often went unfulfilled
when employers used these benefits for their own purposes.12 ERISA was
enacted in 1974 in response to deepening concerns of widespread fraud and
abuse in the areas of private employee benefits and pension programs.13
6. See Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 826 (10th Cir. 1996); Doe v.
Group Hospitalization & Med. Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 87 (4th Cir. 1993); Wildbur v. Arco Chem. Co., 974
F.2d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 1992); Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employee’s Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048,
1052-53 (7th Cir. 1987).
7. See Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1323 (9th Cir. 1995); Kotrosits v. GATX
Corp. Non-Contributory Pension Plan for Salaried Employees, 970 F.2d 1165, 1173 (3d Cir. 1992);
Brown v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1566-67 (11th Cir. 1990).
8. See Armstrong v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 128 F.3d 1263, 1265 (8th Cir. 1997).
9. Id.
10. 144 F.3d 1157, 1161 (8th Cir. 1998).
11. For an overview of pre-ERISA benefits law see Jay Conison, Suits for Benefits Under Erisa,
54 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 35-46 (1992).
12. See Conison, supra note 11, at 36.
13. Congressional findings and declaration of policy behind ERISA are expressed in 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (1994):
(a) Benefit plans as affecting interstate commerce and the Federal taxing power
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit plans in
recent years has been rapid and substantial; that the operational scope and economic impact of
such plans is increasingly interstate; that the continued well-being and security of millions of
employees and their dependents are directly affected by these plans; that they are affected with a
national public interest; that they have become an important factor affecting the stability of
employment and the successful development of industrial relations; that they have become an
important factor in commerce because of the interstate character of their activities, and of the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss4/11
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ERISA established duties and standards of performance for administrators
and fiduciaries of employee benefit and pension plans in order to ensure the
safeguarding of valuable14 benefit expectations.15
Congressional intent to implement meaningful reform is evident in
activities of their participants, and the employers, employee organizations, and other entities by
which they are established or maintained; that a large volume of the activities of such plans are
carried on by means of the mails and instrumentalities of interstate commerce; that owing to the
lack of employee information and adequate safeguards concerning their operation, it is desirable in
the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, and to provide for the general welfare and the
free flow of commerce, that disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with respect to the
establishment, operation, and administration of such plans; that they substantially affect the
revenues of the United States because they are afforded preferential Federal tax treatment; that
despite the enormous growth in such plans many employees with long years of employment are
losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans; that
owing to the inadequacy of current minimum standards, the soundness and stability of plans with
respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered; that owing to the
termination of plans before requisite funds have been accumulated, employees and their
beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated benefits; and that it is therefore desirable in the
interests of employees and their beneficiaries, for the protection of the revenue of the United
States, and to provide for the free flow of commerce, that minimum standards be provided
assuring the equitable character of such plans and their financial soundness.
(b) Protection of interstate commerce and beneficiaries by requiring disclosure and reporting,
setting standards of conduct, etc., for fiduciaries
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect interstate commerce and the
interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the
disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with
respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries
of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access
to the Federal courts.
(c) Protection of interstate commerce, the Federal taxing power, and beneficiaries by vesting
of accrued benefits, setting minimum standards of funding, requiring termination insurance
It is hereby further declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect interstate commerce, the
Federal taxing power, and the interests of participants in private pension plans and their
beneficiaries by improving the equitable character and the soundness of such plans by requiring
them to vest the accrued benefits of employees with significant periods of service, to meet
minimum standards of funding, and by requiring plan termination insurance.
Id.
14. See Francis X. Lilly, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 35 LAB. L.J. 603
(1984):
In 1975, the first full calendar year in which ERISA was on the books, there were approximately
340,000 total retirement plans, covering over 44.5 million participants and beneficiaries. These
plans had assets of over $543 billion. By the end of 1983, the number of private pension plans had
more than doubled, totaling more than 775,000 and covering almost 67 million participants, and
their assets were approximately $900 billion . . . .
Id. at 604; see also W. Michael Kaiser, Labor’s New Weapon: Pension Fund Leverage— Can Labor
Legally Beat Its Plowshares Into Swords?, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 409 (1982). “In 1975, private pension
plans subject to . . . (ERISA) had assets of approximately $211.5 billion. Those assets had more than
doubled by 1980 to $430.6 billion. This number is expected to double by 1985, double again by 1990,
and approach three trillion dollars in 1995!” Id. at 409.
15. See supra note 13 for text of 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994).
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ERISA’s broad civil enforcement provision.16 In part, § 1132(a) provides that
a “civil action may be brought (1) by a participant or beneficiary . . . (B) to
recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan . . . .”17 However,
each ERISA-governed employee benefit plan must establish an internal
claim and claim review procedure,18 and although not expressly required by
the statute, courts have held that, with some exceptions, the plan participant
must exhaust all administrative remedies available under the plan prior to
bringing suit under § 1132(a).19
16. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) reads:
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action
A civil action may be brought—
(1) by a participant or beneficiary—
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the
terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under
section 1109 of this title;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates
any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate
equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or
the terms of the plan;
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate relief in the case of a
violation of 1025(c) of this title;
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, by the Secretary (A) to
enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter, or (B) to obtain other
appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of this
subchapter;
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under paragraph (2), (4), (5), or (6) of
subsection (c) of this section or under subsection (i) or (l) of this section;
(7) by a State to enforce compliance with a qualified medical child support order (as defined
in section 1169(a)(2)(A) of this title);
(8) by the Secretary, or by an employer or other person referred to in section 1021(f)(1) of
this title, (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates subsection (f) of section 1021 of this title,
or (B) to obtain appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce such
subsection; or
(9) in the event that the purchase of an insurance contract or insurance annuity in connection
with termination of an individual’s status as a participant covered under a pension plan with
respect to all or any portion of the participant’s pension benefit under such plan constitutes a
violation of part 4 of this title or the terms of the plan, by the Secretary, by any individual who was
a participant or beneficiary at the time of the alleged violation, or by a fiduciary, to obtain
appropriate relief, including the posting of security if necessary, to assure receipt by the participant
or beneficiary of the amounts provided or to be provided by such insurance contract or annuity,
plus reasonable prejudgment interest on such amounts.
Id. (citation omitted).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994).
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1994).
19. See Charles P. Efflandt, An Overview of Civil Litigation Under ERISA, 59 No. 6, J.K.B.A. 24
(1990). “ERISA does not expressly require participants and beneficiaries to exhaust th[e] internal
remedies [required by 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1985)] before initiating civil litigation.” Id. at 26. See also
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss4/11
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The central question that has puzzled courts is what standard of review is
appropriate in § 1132(a)(1)(B) cases. The spectrum of review20 ranges from a
stringent standard in the form of de novo review, to a deferential standard in
which the court will uphold the administrator’s denial unless arbitrary or
capricious.21 De novo review of the administrator’s denial of a benefits claim
provides greater protection for the plan participant, giving her a second
chance to obtain denied benefits because the reviewing court will give less
deference to the administrator’s decision.22 However, de novo review also
means higher costs for employers, placing upon them the burden of multiple,
redundant proceedings. Employers, therefore, consistently argue that courts
should give deference to an administrator’s denial of benefits claims.23
However, the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review supported by
employers puts the employee, who already lost in the “administrative”
proceeding, at an obvious disadvantage because the reviewing court will not
conduct an independent review of the denial, but will instead defer to the
administrator’s decision. The determination of which standard of review to
apply in a § 1132(a)(1)(B) action ultimately depends on a careful balancing
of ERISA’s central purpose of safeguarding benefits on the one hand and the
broad public policy that encourages employers to offer ERISA-governed
employee benefit plans on the other.
A further complication in this field arises when an administrator has a
conflict of interest and that conflict plays a part in the administrator’s
decision to deny the benefits claim. A typical conflict of interest occurs when
the plan administrator is subject to the employer’s control and must decide
whether to fulfill its fiduciary duty to the plan participant by paying the
benefits claim, or to conserve the employer’s funds by denying the benefits.24
Skrobacz v. Int’l Harvester, 582 F. Supp. 1192, 1195 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (stating that “plaintiffs must
pursue . . . [p]lan remedies before they can maintain an action for benefits . . . under section
1132(a)(1)(B).”); Lucas v. Warner & Swasey Co., 475 F. Supp. 1071, 1074 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(exhaustion of administrative remedies is generally required prior to suit under ERISA, except when
such attempts would result in irreparable harm or would be futile); Morgan v. Laborers Pension Trust
Fund for N. California, 433 F. Supp. 518, 528 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (same).
20. The term “spectrum of review” is meant to describe the general group of all possible
standards of review arranged from the most stringent on one end to the most deferential on the other.
21. See infra notes 22-39 and accompanying text.
22. See Pratt v. Petroleum Prod. Mgmt. Employee Sav. Plan, 920 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1990).
“Under a de novo standard, we would ask not whether the fiduciaries’ interpretation of the contract
was arbitrary and capricious, but only whether it was correct.” Id. at 658 (emphasis in original).
23. See Winters v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 49 F.3d 550, 553 (9th Cir. 1995); Merideth v.
Allsteel, Inc., 11 F.3d 1354, 1357 (7th Cir. 1993).
24. For a discussion of typical conflicts of interest in this area see Noel Christian Capps, Note,
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch: Are Lower Courts Following The United States Supreme Court
Decision in Erisa Benefit Determinations?, 31 WASHBURN L.J. 280, 289. (1992).
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Prior to 1989, courts had developed two alternative views on the proper
standard of review in cases where a conflicted plan administrator denied a
benefits claim.
One view was articulated by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Bruch
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.25 The plaintiffs in Bruch were employed in
Firestone’s plastics division.26 They argued that they were entitled to benefits
under Firestone’s severance plan after Firestone sold its plastics division to
Occidental Petroleum Company.27 Firestone, acting as both the plan
administrator and the fiduciary, denied the benefits claim.28 The district court
granted Firestone’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that
Firestone’s denial of benefits was not arbitrary and capricious.29 The Third
Circuit reversed, rejecting the district court’s use of the arbitrary and
capricious standard, and held that when an employer acts both as a plan
administrator and a fiduciary, there exists a conflict of interest, and the
decision to deny benefits is subject to the more stringent de novo review.30
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a different position several
months later in Van Boxel v. The Journal Co. Employees’ Pension Trust.31
The plaintiff in Van Boxel took a twenty-five year leave of absence from his
job at the Journal Company to head the local printers’ union.32 Although
plaintiff’s leave was without pay, his name repeatedly appeared on the
company’s list of employees who were guaranteed their jobs until they
reached the age of 65.33 When plaintiff asked the company for his pension,
claiming that his extended leave of absence counted towards the pension
plan’s required twenty years of service, the company refused his request.34
Judge Posner, writing for the Van Boxel court, concluded that “the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review may be inapt,”35 but unlike the
Third Circuit in Bruch, refused to abandon it altogether. Judge Posner
characterized the arbitrary and capricious standard as a “sliding scale of
judicial review”36 that “may be a range, not a point.”37 Under this view, a
25. 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987).
26. See id. at 136.
27. See id. at 136-37.
28. See id. at 136.
29. See Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 640 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
30. See Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 137-45 (3d Cir. 1987).
31. 836 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir. 1987).
32. See id. at 1049.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 1052. Posner stated that even though he considered the standard improper, it does not
do “serious harm” due to its “vagueness and elasticity.” Id.
36. Id.
37. 836 F.2d at 1052.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss4/11
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court that is asked to review a denial of benefits by an administrator with a
conflict of interest should adjust the amount of deference given to the
administrator’s decision, with the degree of adjustment dependent upon the
seriousness of the conflict. The review becomes “more penetrating the
greater is the suspicion of partiality, less penetrating the smaller that
suspicion is.”38 Thus, when there are no allegations of a conflict of interest,
or when the allegations cannot be proven, the proper standard of review is the
highly deferential “arbitrary or capricious” standard. In cases where the
decision maker has “a serious conflict of interest, however, the proper
deference to give their decisions may be slight, even zero. . .  .”39 In such
cases, the standard of review essentially becomes de novo.
A. The Supreme Court Defines the Proper Standard of Review in
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch
Presented with the alternative standards of review adopted by the Third
and the Seventh Circuits, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,40 “to resolve the conflicts among
the Courts of Appeals as to the appropriate standard of review in actions
under § 1132(a)(1)(B). . .  .”41
On its face, the Supreme Court’s decision adopted neither the Third
Circuit’s nor the Seventh Circuit’s approaches. Instead, recognizing that
ERISA codified many principles of the common law of trusts,42 the Court
relied on common law trust principles to announce that the appropriate
standard of review in § 1132(a)(1)(B) actions depends not on the plan
administrator’s partiality, but on whether the particular plan document “gives
the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility
for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.”43 The Court held that de
novo review must be applied when the plan documents grant no such
authority.44 When a plan explicitly grants discretion to the administrator,
however, courts may reverse the plan administrator’s denial only when that
discretion has been abused.45
The Supreme Court also added that “if a benefit plan gives discretion to
38. Id. at 1052-53.
39. Id. at 1052.
40. The grant of certiorari can be found at 485 U.S. 986 (1988).
41. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108 (1989).
42. See id. at 110.
43. Id. at 115.
44. See id.
45. See id.
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an administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest,
that conflict must be weighed as a ‘facto[r] in determining whether there is
an abuse of discretion.’”46
B. Eighth Circuit’s Standard of Review Before and After Bruch
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Bruch, the Eighth Circuit treated
plan administrators’ benefit claim denials with a high level of deference.47
After Bruch, however, the Eighth Circuit adjusted the standard in light of the
Supreme Court’s broad holding.48 The Eighth Circuit subsequently has held
that in cases where the plan documents failed to grant authority or discretion
to the plan administrator, the administrator’s denial should be reviewed de
novo.49 However, in cases where the plan explicitly confers authority or
discretion on the administrator, the Eighth Circuit has held that the reviewing
court should be highly deferential and reverse the administrator’s denial of
benefits only when there has been an abuse of discretion.50
Until recently, however, the Eighth Circuit had not had an occasion to
decide on the appropriate standard of review in cases where a conflicted plan
46. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187, cmt. d (1959)).
47. See Hickman v. Tosco Corp., 840 F.2d 564, 566 (8th Cir. 1988); Redmond v. Burlington N.
R.R. Co. Pension Plan, 821 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 1987); Lawrence v. Westerhaus, 780 F.2d 1321,
1322 (8th Cir. 1985); Central Hardware Co. v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension
Fund, 770 F.2d 106, 109 (8th Cir. 1985); Short v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas
Pension Fund, 729 F.2d 567, 571 (8th Cir. 1984); Quinn v. Burlington N. Inc. Pension Plan, 664 F.2d
675, 678 (8th Cir. 1981); Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir. 1981); Bueneman v.
Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 572 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir. 1978).
48. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
49. See Brown v. Seitz Foods, Inc. Disability Benefit Plan, 140 F.3d 1198, 1200 (8th Cir. 1998);
Wilson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 97 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 1996); National Auto. Dealers and
Assocs. Retirement Trust v. Arbeitman, 89 F.3d 496, 498 (8th Cir. 1996); Ravenscraft v. Hy-Vee
Employee Benefit Plan and Trust, 85 F.3d 398, 402 (8th Cir. 1996); Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y of the
U.S. v. Chrysler, 66 F.3d 944, 949 (8th Cir. 1995); Welsh v. Burlington N., Inc., Employee Benefits
Plan, 54 F.3d 1331, 1335 (8th Cir. 1995); Bounds v. Bell Atl. Enters. Flexible Long-Term Disability
Plan, 32 F.3d 337, 339 (8th Cir. 1994); Stock v. SHARE, 18 F.3d 1419, 1422 (8th Cir. 1994);
Donatelli v. Home Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 1993); Maxa v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 972
F.2d 980, 983 (8th Cir. 1992); Dvorak v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 965 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir.
1992); Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1989); Wallace v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
882 F.2d 1327, 1329-30 (8th Cir. 1989).
50. See Hawkeye Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. AVIS Indus. Corp., 122 F.3d 490, 496-97 (8th Cir. 1997);
Hutchins v. Champion Int’l Corp., 110 F.3d 1341, 1344 (8th Cir. 1997); Cash v. Wal-Mart Group
Health Plan, 107 F.3d 637, 640-41 (8th Cir. 1997); Fink v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 489, 491
(8th Cir. 1996); Wald v. Southwestern Bell Corp. Customcare Med. Plan, 83 F.3d 1002, 1006 (8th Cir.
1996); Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 1996); Kennedy v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 31
F.3d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1994); Lutheran Med. Ctr. of Omaha, Neb. v. Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters
& Eng’rs Health and Welfare Plan, 25 F.3d 616, 620 (8th Cir. 1994); Brumm v. Bert Bell NFL
Retirement Plan, 995 F.2d 1433, 1437 (8th Cir. 1993); Oldenburger v. Central States Southeast &
Southwest Areas Teamster Pension Fund, 934 F.2d 171, 173 (8th Cir. 1991).
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administrator denies benefits. The Eighth Circuit first confronted the issue of
the proper standard of review of benefit claim denial by a conflicted
administrator in Armstrong v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.51 The plaintiff,
Pamela Armstrong, was diagnosed with leukemia in 1993.52 She underwent
chemotherapy treatment and her cancer went into remission.53 While in
remission, Anderson changed jobs and moved from her home in Colorado to
Missouri.54 Her new employer offered her a group health insurance plan
provided by Aetna.55 Under the terms of the plan, Aetna was both the insurer
and administrator.56 The plan gave Aetna “broad discretion to construe the
terms of the plan.”57
In 1995, Armstrong’s leukemia returned and she underwent
chemotherapy treatment and a bone marrow transplant.58 When she sought
coverage for her treatments from Aetna, the company limited the amount of
her claim on the grounds that Armstrong’s leukemia was a “pre-existing
condition.”59 Armstrong challenged Aetna’s denial, and argued that the
district court “should review Aetna’s decision de novo because Aetna’s role
as both insurer and administrator of the plan created a conflict of interest.”60
Armstrong produced evidence that Aetna provided “incentives and bonuses
to its claim reviewers based on criteria that include[d] a category called
‘claims savings.’”61 Armstrong argued that these incentives and bonuses
prevented Aetna’s claim reviewers from making an impartial review of her
claim.62 The district court, however, applied the abuse of discretion standard
and found that Aetna’s denial of Armstrong’s claim was supported by
substantial evidence.63
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, Armstrong challenged the district court’s
use of the abuse of discretion standard.64 The Eighth Circuit discussed both
the strict “presumptively void” approach taken by the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits and the deferential “sliding scale” approach taken by the Fourth,
51. 128 F.3d 1263 (8th Cir. 1997).
52. See id. at 1264.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See 128 F.3d at 1264.
57. Id. at 1266-67 (Beam, J., concurring and, in part, dissenting).
58. See id. at 1264.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 128 F.3d at 1265.
62. Id. at 1264-65.
63. See id. at 1265.
64. See id.
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Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits.65
The Eighth Circuit held that the circumstances of Armstrong required the
Court “to review Aetna’s decision to deny benefits de novo.”66 The
Armstrong court recognized that Aetna’s role as insurer gave the company
“an obvious interest in minimizing its claim payments.”67 Because this
interest was counter to Aetna’s interest as plan administrator, Aetna “faces a
continuing conflict.”68
Less than a week after deciding on the proper standard of review in
Armstrong, the Eighth Circuit faced the same issue in Woo v. Deluxe Corp.69
In 1993, while in the employ of Deluxe, the plaintiff, Beverly Woo, began
experiencing “severe fatigue, stiff joints, arthritis-like pain, and a loss of
concentration and memory.”70 Late in 1993, Woo resigned from Deluxe.71
Several months after her resignation, Woo was diagnosed with systemic
scleroderma, a slowly progressive disease that results in death.72 Woo’s
doctor reviewed her medical record and found that she became disabled
while still working for Deluxe.73 Woo subsequently applied for benefits
under the Deluxe Group Long-Term Disability Plan (“LTDP”).74 The
Hartford Life Insurance Company, the LTDP administrator, denied Woo’s
claim and her subsequent appeals.75 Woo filed a § 1132(a)(1)(B) action, and
presented evidence that Hartford had a financial incentive to deny her
claim.76
65. See id. The “presumptively void” test adopted by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits requires
that “a decision rendered by a plan administrator with such a conflict is presumed to be an abuse of
discretion unless the administrator can demonstrate that either (1) under de novo review the result was
correct, or (2) the decision was not made to serve the administrator’s conflicting interest.” Id. The
“sliding scale” approach adopted by the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits requires the court to
apply an “abuse-of-discretion standard but decreases the amount of discretion given to the
administrators in proportion to the seriousness of the conflict.” Id.
66. 128 F.3d at 1265.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 144 F.3d 1157 (8th Cir. 1998).
70. Id. at 1159.
71. See id. at 1160.
72. See id. The Court noted that “[S]ystemic scleroderma is a ‘disorder of the connective tissue
characterized by induration and thickening of the skin, by abnormalities . . . and by fibrotic
degenerative changes in various body organs, including the heart, lungs, kidneys, and gastrointestinal
tract.’” Id. at 1159 n.1 (citing Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1495 (28th ed. 1994)). “‘The
condition is usually slowly progressive over many years, and death is usually due to renal or cardiac
failure or to sepsis.’” Id. at 1159 n.1 (citing Stark v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 1092, 1094 n.1 (7th Cir.
1974)).
73. See id. at 1160.
74. See 144 F.3d at 1160.
75. See id. Hartford Life denied her claim because “she was not disabled when she resigned from
Deluxe.” Id.
76. See id. at 1160.
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Woo demonstrated that “Deluxe sponsors and funds the LTDP during the
first two years of a qualifying disability. After that two-year period, Hartford
insures the plan for the remaining period of disability.”77 Woo argued that
“when Hartford, as plan administrator, denies benefits, it will receive a direct
financial benefit as plan insurer, if the disability extends beyond the two
years.”78
The district court granted Hartford’s motion for summary judgment,
concluding that Hartford had not abused its discretion in denying Woo’s
claim.79
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit once again noted the different approaches
taken by appellate courts in the context of administrator conflicts of
interest.80 In striking contrast to its position in Armstrong, however, the Woo
Court held that “[b]ased on our review of [Bruch], we adopt the ‘sliding
scale’ approach.”81
The Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its adoption of the “sliding scale” approach
several months later in Farley v. Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield 82 by
holding that a “plan beneficiary is not entitled to less deferential review
absent material, probative evidence demonstrating that a palpable conflict of
interest existed, which caused a serious breach of the administrator’s
fiduciary duty.”83
III. ANALYSIS
The Armstrong and Woo decisions appear to stand in stark contrast to one
another. In Armstrong, the Eighth Circuit applied the stringent de novo
77. Id. at 1161.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 1160.
80. See 144 F.3d at 1161. The Court noted that the Tenth Circuit adopted the “sliding scale”
approach, while the Eleventh Circuit prefers the “presumptively void” approach. Id.
81. Id.
82. 147 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 1998). Here, Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield was the insurer and
administrator of a health insurance plan provided by Farley’s spouse’s employer, International Paper
Company. See id. at 775. Blue Cross denied Farley’s claim that resulted from medical treatments for
an enlarged uterus. Blue Cross argued that Farley’s claim was not covered as a preexisting condition
because her symptoms first appeared two weeks before she became eligible for the health insurance
plan. See id.
83. Id. at 776 (citing Woo, 1998 WL 261176 at *3-4. The court rejected Farley’s argument that
Blue Cross’s “desire to maintain competitive insurance rates [should automatically] be construed as a
conflict of interest.” Id. at 777. The court concluded that “[I]n the long run, an insurer that routinely
denies valid claims for benefits would have difficulty retaining current customers and attracting new
business, thus providing an incentive to “make these determinations in a fair and consistent manner,
thus negating any indicia of bias.” Id.
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1383+Cumulative+Index.doc 03/22/00   9:31 AM
1380 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 77:1369
standard of review.84 In Woo, however, the Eighth Circuit adopted the more
deferential “sliding scale” standard in which the administrator’s decision is
reviewed for abuse of discretion and the administrator’s conflict of interest is
simply weighed as a factor in determining whether there is such abuse.85 The
standards applied by the Eighth Circuit in these two cases are at opposite
ends of the spectrum of review.86
Despite these stark differences, Armstrong and Woo are reconcilable. It is
worthwhile to note that Armstrong did not adopt the de novo standard of
review in all cases where an administrator labors under a conflict of
interest.87 Instead, the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Armstrong was limited to
the specific circumstances of that case.88
In Armstrong, the Eighth Circuit recognized that “Aetna ha[d] an obvious
interest in minimizing its claim payments.”89 Apparently, the court
considered this interest “obvious” because Aetna is a profit driven enterprise.
However, this interest alone probably would not have been enough to
warrant stringent review. Instead, the fact that seems to have swayed the
Armstrong court was Aetna’s incentive and bonus program that may have
encouraged claim reviewers to reject meritorious claims.90 This fact alone,
which the Armstrong court believed created a serious conflict of interest,91
may have been enough for the court to reduce what would otherwise have
been deferential abuse of discretion review to the stringent de novo review.
Armstrong may be precisely the type of case that Judge Posner
hypothesized in Van Boxel when he noted that in cases when administrators
“have a serious conflict of interest, the proper deference to give their
decisions may be slight, even zero.”92 The zero-deference standard of review
in Armstrong was the result of the serious conflict of interest created by
Aetna’s bonus and incentive program.
Thus, Armstrong and Woo can both be seen as cases in which the court
applies the “sliding scale” standard of review. In Armstrong the egregious
84. See Armstrong, 128 F.3d at 1265. See also supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
85. See Woo, 144 F.3d at 1161. See also supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 20.
87. But see Armstrong, 128 F.3d at 1266-67 (Beam, J., concurring and, in part, dissenting)
(noting that the majority’s adoption of the de novo standard in Armstrong is contrary to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bruch).
88. See Armstrong, 128 F.3d at 1265 (holding that the decision to apply the de novo review was
based on “the circumstance of this case,” thus limiting the holding).
89. Id.
90. The court, in determining that Aetna had a conflict of interest, focused on the “incentives and
bonuses to its claims reviewers,” given by Aetna based on denied claims. Id.
91. See Armstrong, 128 F.3d at 1265.
92. See Van Boxel, 836 F.2d at 1052.
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conflict of interest caused the scale to slide to the most stringent side of the
spectrum of review: de novo review. In Woo, however, Hartford’s financial
conflict of interest was sufficient to slide the scale away from deferential
review, but was not serious enough to allow for de novo review.
The Eighth Circuit’s explicit adoption of the “sliding scale” standard of
review in Woo is in agreement with the Supreme Court’s dicta in Bruch,93
that in the case of a plan which gives the administrator discretion, a plan
administrator’s conflict of interest should be “weighed as a ‘facto[r] in
determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.’”94 This language
implies that reviewing courts should always start with a deferential, abuse of
discretion review, and then scale back that review when a beneficiary
presents evidence that the plan administrator had a conflict of interest that
may have influenced the denial of benefits.95
This is precisely the approach followed by the Eighth Circuit in
Armstrong and Woo. In both cases the court modified the abuse of discretion
standard of review, although to different extents, by weighing the
administrator’s respective conflicts of interest. Because the conflict in
Armstrong was so serious, the court reviewed Aetna’s denial with the least
possible deference.96 In Woo, a less serious conflict resulted in more
deferential review.97
Some legal commentators have criticized the “sliding scale” standard of
review as being in conflict with the ERISA’s broad purpose to ensure and
safeguard benefit expectations for employees.98 The general complaint about
this level of review is that employers and plan administrators are aided by
lenient courts in their efforts to thwart benefit expectations.99
This criticism, however, ignores the fact that ERISA was designed not
only to secure employee benefits, but also to encourage employers to offer
and maintain benefit plans for their employees.100 The “sliding scale”
standard of review is in keeping with a congressional “desire not to create a
[benefits] system that is so complex that administrative costs, or litigation
expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering welfare benefits plans
93. See Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115.
94. Id.
95. See Armstrong, 128 F.3d at 1267 (Beam, J., concurring, and in part, dissenting).
96. See supra notes 66-68, 90-92 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 76, 92 and accompanying text.
98. For a discussion of ERISA’s broad purpose, see supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of criticisms of the “sliding scale” approach, see infra note 100 and accompanying
text.
99. See generally Capps, supra note 24, at 288-90; see also Conison, supra note 11, at 34 and 62.
100. See Youngberg v. Bekins Co., 930 F. Supp. 1396, 1402 (E.D. Cal. 1996).
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in the first place.”101 Although the “sliding scale” standard of review is more
lenient on conflicted plan administrators, a more stringent standard, with
higher administrative and litigation costs, may force employers and plan
administrators to curtail or cancel existing employee benefit plans. This result
would be detrimental to employees and contrary to the traditional
congressional goals underlying ERISA. The “sliding scale” standard of
review strikes the proper balance by allowing employees to seek effective
review of denied benefits, and, at the same time, by encouraging employers
to offer and maintain employee beneifits plans.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit’s adoption of the “sliding scale” approach in Woo was
not a radical departure from the approach the Eighth Circuit took in
Armstrong. In fact, the Eighth Circuit may have adopted the “sliding scale”
approach as far back as Armstrong and simply adjusted the standard of
review in Armstrong to reflect what the court considered an egregious
conflict of interest in that case.102
The “sliding scale” standard of review conforms with traditional
congressional goals underlying ERISA by encouraging employers and plan
administrators to offer and maintain employee benefit plans.103
Kirill Y. Abramov
101. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996).
102. See supra notes 87-92, 97 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
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